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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

J OURNAL of

LAW REFORM ONLINE
COMMENT

JUDGES! STOP DEFERRING TO CLASS-ACTION LAWYERS
Brian Wolfman*
I. THE PROBLEM
I represent a national non-profit consumer rights organization,
as an amicus, in a federal appeal challenging a district court’s
approval of a class-action settlement of claims under the federal
Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA).1 My client maintains that
the district court erred in finding that the settlement was “fair,
reasonable, and adequate,” which is the standard for class-action
settlement approval under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2
In particular, we argue that the district court committed a
reversible legal error when it deferred to the class-action lawyers’
recommendation to approve the settlement because, in those
lawyers’ view, it was fair, reasonable, and adequate. We also argue
that the district court erred when, in approving the settlement, it
relied in part on its belief that the plaintiffs’ counsel, whose work
the judge had observed for years, are really good lawyers.
The judge said that one factor that persuaded him to approve
the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate was his “complete
confidence in the ability and integrity” of the lawyers for the
class. 3 Those lawyers, he said, “are well known to me. They have
*
Visiting Professor and Co-Director, Institute of Public Representation, Georgetown
University Law Center; formerly staff lawyer (1990-2004) and director (2004-2009), Public
Citizen Litigation Group; co-coordinator, Consumer Law & Policy Blog, www.clpblog.org.
As relevant here, Mr. Wolfman frequently is counsel for objectors to class-action
settlements. See, e.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, 691 F.3d 218 (2d Cir.
2012); Klier v. Elf Atochem, 658 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418
F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315 (3d
Cir. 2001); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768 (3d Cir. 1995).
1.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1679-1679l.
2.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
3.
Order [approving class-action settlement] at 16 in Miranda L. Day v. Persels &
Associates, LLC, No. 8:10-cv-2463-T-TGW (Mar. 12, 2010) (Doc. 157) (hereinafter “Order”).
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exceptional legal abilities and the utmost integrity. Consequently,
not only am I convinced that there was no fraud and collusion in
this case, but that plaintiff’s counsel obtained in settlement the
most that was achievable.” 4 “Counsel for the Class,” the judge
explained, “are seasoned attorneys and they have determined that
this settlement is the best option under the circumstances.” 5 A
court, the judge concluded, “should be hesitant to substitute its
judgment for that of counsel,” accurately quoting a recent, nonprecedential Eleventh Circuit decision. 6
To get a bit highfalutin for a moment, if you are thinking that
what the judge did here is at odds with one of our most famous
expositions of judicial independence—that “[t]he government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of
laws, and not of men”7—you’d be right. After all, the judge
approved a class-action settlement based not solely on his
independent scrutiny of the law and facts, but instead in
significant part on deference to the class lawyers’ reputations and
their “judgment” that the settlement was a good deal.
But if you also thought that what the judge did here was
unusual, you’d be very wrong. As noted, the judge followed a
recent unpublished appellate decision, and dozens of decisions
approving class-actions settlements have said the same or similar
things, sometimes all but abdicating the judicial role to lawyers
and nearly fawning over their reputations in the course of
settlement approval. As I now explain, despite a few contrary
voices,
judicial
deference
to
class-action
lawyers’
recommendations, reputations, and experience remains an
important part of the settlement-approval landscape.
II. A FEW EXAMPLES AMONG MANY
A few examples of judicial deference help illustrate the
problem. In approving complex antitrust settlements, one court
trumpeted the lawyers on both sides of the case as “among the
4.
Id. at 22.
5.
Id. at 31–32 (emphasis added).
6.
Id. at 15 (quoting Canupp v. Liberty Behavorial Healthcare Corp., 447 Fed. Appx.
976, 978 (11th Cir. 2011)); see also id. at 32 (quoting Canupp, 447 Fed. Appx. at 977–78 (“In
considering the [class-action] settlement, the court is entitled to rely on the judgment of
experienced counsel for the parties.”).
7.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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best and most experienced antitrust litigators in the country.”
“Consequently,” the judge said, “their opinion that these
Settlements are fair, adequate, and reasonable is deserving of this
Court’s consideration.” 8 Although the court said it would not
“blindly defer” to counsel, it nevertheless concluded that “it must
consider that the Settlements were reached after several months
of arms’ length negotiation by experienced counsel and that both
counsel and all parties involved view the settlements as
reasonable.” 9
In approving the settlement of an employment-discrimination
class action, another court explained:
Both of plaintiffs’ counsel … and several of the defendants’
counsel, have expressed themselves in favor of the settlement
agreement. It is their opinion that the future course of conduct
by the defendant … will be much improved, and that the
affirmative action plan will be complied with in good faith.
The Court has a high opinion of all counsel who have
participated in this litigation. Their judgment as to the merits
of the settlement agreement therefore weighs heavily with the
Court, particularly since the Court is convinced that
agreement was not reached easily but rather was the result of
long and difficult negotiations. 10
And, in a case involving the alleged theft of corneas from the
dead, the court noted that the plaintiffs’ lawyer had “over 23 years’
experience as a trial attorney” and was “extremely qualified and
experienced in medical class action litigation.” 11 The Court
concluded that the lawyers’ “recommendation” leaned “in favor of
approval of the proposed settlement.” 12 These three cases are, as
I’ve said, just examples. Many recent rulings follow the same
pattern. 13

8.
In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 100, 106 (D.D.C. 2004).
9.
Id. (emphasis added).
10. Wattleton v. Ladish Co., 89 F.R.D. 677, 685 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
11. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp. 2d 894, 906 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Chavarria v. N.Y. Airport Serv., LLC, 875 F. Supp.2d 164, 172–73 (E.D.N.Y.
2012); Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. N.Y. LLC, 874 F. Supp.2d 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(recommendations of “experienced” counsel are entitled to “great weight”); Sabo v. United
States, 102 Fed. 619, 628 (Fed. Cl. 2011); Perez v. Asurion Corp., 501 F. Supp.2d 1360, 1380
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (explaining that court “must rely upon the judgment of experienced
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III. SOME PUSHBACK (BUT NOT ENOUGH)
Not every court has followed in lockstep. One appellate court
rejected
deference
to
counsel’s
settlement-approval
recommendation because that would undermine judicial
independence in a context where independence is essential. 14
“Reliance on counsel’s opinion,” the court explained, “tends to
render the district court captive to the attorney and fosters rubber
stamping by the court rather than the careful scrutiny which is
essential in judicial approval of class action settlements.” 15 Nor,
for example, would it be possible to square deference to classaction lawyers with the views of the late Third Circuit judge
Edward Becker. Writing for the court in his important and wideranging General Motors decision, Judge Becker insisted that
district courts scrutinize class settlements with great care to
protect the interests of absent class members, eyes wide open to
both the fee-seeking motives of class counsel and the preclusionhappy motives of defendants. 16
And the American Law Institute (ALI), in its 2009 Principles of
the Law of Aggregate Litigation, expressed skepticism about

deferring to class-action lawyers’ settlement recommendations,
explaining (in understated fashion) that “the court should keep in
mind that the lawyers who negotiated the settlement will rarely
offer anything less than a strong, favorable endorsement.” 17 But
the ALI gave mixed signals. It said that a “court might give weight
to the fact that counsel or the class or the defendant favors the
settlement,” though it provided no guidance about when
deference to defense counsel might be appropriate. 18 On the
plaintiffs’ side, on the other hand, the ALI said that “counsel’s
willingness to propose a settlement may be entitled to some

counsel and, absent fraud, ‘should be hesitant to substitute its own judgment for that of
counsel.’”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
14. See Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1149–50 (11th Cir. 1983).
15. Id. at 1150.
16. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 783–800, 801–03 (3d Cir. 1995); see also, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 830
(9th Cir. 2012) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
17. Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation ¶ 3.05(a), comment a, at 206 (Amer.
Law Inst. 2009).
18. Id. at 205–06 (emphasis added).
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weight … [w]hen class counsel shares class members’ interest in
maximizing claim values .…” 19
The ALI has a point, but not one that justifies judicial
deference to the settlement recommendation of class-action
lawyers. To be sure, linking the economic fate of plaintiffs’ classaction lawyers to that of their clients is often a sensible tool for
controlling the lawyers’ conduct. 20 In particular, settlement
provisions providing this link should encourage the lawyers to
work hard to put money in the clients’ pockets once the settlement
has been approved. 21 Therefore, a judge properly may consider the
presence of a provision tying fees to client compensation in
deciding whether to approve a class settlement.
But a provision that directly links the amount of lawyer
compensation with the amount of client compensation is not a
sufficient reason for a judge to defer to the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s
recommendation to approve a settlement rather than exercising
her independent judgment regarding the settlement terms
themselves. After all, a key concern is whether a defendant,
knowing that the plaintiffs’ lawyer has an interest in a fee, 22 has
offered less in settlement than is optimal, and that remains a
concern where the settlement is structured to tie the lawyer’s
economic interest to that of her clients. A quick, cheap settlement
may benefit the plaintiffs’ lawyer (without optimizing client
recovery), because she can reap a handsome fee with little work, 23
leaving her free to move on to the next case in short order. 24

19. Id. at 206.
20. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (requiring that
plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amounts actually paid to
the class members); see also Strong v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 851–54
(5th Cir. 1998) (similar).
21. See, e.g., Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 989 F. Supp. 375, 380 (D.
Mass. 1997); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 126, 1284 (S.D. Ohio 1996), recon. denied,
927 F. Supp. 1036, 1044 (S.D. Ohio 1996), aff’d in rel. part, 102 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 1996).
22. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 802 (3d Cir. 1995).
23. Id. at 801–02, 803.
24. The ALI also explained that reliance on class-action lawyers’ experience “should
not normally lighten the burden” of showing that the settlement is fair and that the
fairness determination ordinarily should depend on “the specific facts of the settlement.”
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation ¶3.05, comment c, at 209 (Amer. Law. Inst.
2009) (emphasis added). The ALI did not, however, describe the “abnormal” circumstances
in which reliance on a lawyer’s experience might be warranted.
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To be sure, in some cases, only the fairness of the amount of a
settlement is disputed. In that situation, the court will attempt to
appraise the value of the class claims by discounting the value of
the claims at their maximum by the risk of non-recovery. 25 This
assessment is imprecise (of course), and so the court will generally
approve a settlement if it falls within a range of reasonableness. 26
But determining that range should not be an exercise in deference
to settling counsel. Rather, the court should demand information
from the settling parties that would assist the court in making its
valuation. The court should also pay careful attention to objectors
who have an incentive to question the settling parties’ valuation.
Again, in this circumstance, even where class counsel’s fee is tied
to the class members’ recovery, counsel may be willing to settle
sub-optimally because that could enable her to settle more quickly
and move on to the next case.
IV. WHY THINGS SHOULD CHANGE
As explained, despite some pushback, judges continue to defer
to the class-action lawyers in approving class-action settlements.
That needs to change. In my view, a court should never give
weight to settling counsel’s judgment about the wisdom of a class
settlement or rely on class counsel’s reputation or experience in
assessing a settlement’s fairness or legality. That assessment
should be solely for the court. Any other approach undermines
judicial independence in a context where independence is critical.
To appreciate why deference of the kind that I’ve described
should be rejected consider how a claim for deference would be
viewed in ordinary, one-on-one litigation. Assume that a judge is
presented with a motion in limine. The plaintiff’s brief argues that
the evidence is not hearsay and therefore admissible, while the
defendant’s brief, naturally, argues that the evidence is hearsay
and must be excluded. And suppose that, in ruling on the motion,
the judge says, “This hearsay issue presents a close case, and the
lawyers seem to know more about the problem than I do. Having
read the briefs and reviewed the facts and law, I rule in the

25. See, e.g., Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 179 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Girsh v. Jepsen, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (1974)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,
396 F.3d 96, 117 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d
Cir. 1974)).
26. See, e.g., Dewey, 681 F.3d at 179.
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plaintiff’s favor, deferring to the judgment of plaintiff’s counsel
and taking judicial notice of her fine reputation for first-rate legal
analysis and integrity.” This hypothetical ruling would almost
certainly never occur in real life because a judge is supposed to
decide cases independently, basing her decisions solely on the law
and facts. And, if a district judge in Des Moines issued that ruling,
it would be reversed before it got half way to St. Louis.
With the hearsay example in mind, now consider class-action
settlements. There is more reason to be concerned about
abdication of judicial independence and deference to counsel in
that context than in traditional one-on-one litigation. In class
cases, almost all the plaintiffs—the absentees—have agreed to
nothing because they have no relationship with their lawyer. As a
result, they have no way to monitor their lawyer’s conduct and
demand that she act in their interests. Class settlements therefore
present the possibility of collusive (or at least sub-optimal) deals,
in which the defendant maximizes its “purchase [of] res judicata,” 27
and the class members receive little or nothing, while, in
exchange, plaintiffs’ counsel receives “red-carpet treatment on
fees.” 28 That’s not news. Legal academics and some judges have
appreciated these concerns for years. 29
Although, as indicated earlier, some courts have been effusive
in their praise for class-action lawyers and their recommendations,
most that have deferred to the views of counsel have not provided
a detailed rationale—sometimes saying only that settlement is a
good thing and counsel is more familiar with the nuances of the
case than they are. 30
The lack of information is a concern. Once a class action
settles, the named parties are non-adverse, and judges do not have
their lawyers’ help in ferreting out the case’s strengths and
weaknesses as they do in other cases. This non-adversity, and the

27. Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000).
28. Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991).
29. For a partial collection of judicial opinions and legal scholarship on the potential
for break down in the agency relationship between lawyer and client in class actions, see
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2010). For a recent judicial
discussion of the problem, see Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 830 (9th Cir. 2012)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. N.Y. LLC, 874 F. Supp.2d 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
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resulting concern about an information deficit, certainly
distinguishes the hearsay-objection example discussed earlier. So,
perhaps judges think deference is appropriate when they perceive
themselves to be in the dark. 31 Maybe that’s why, in approving
class-action settlements, with little litigation-engendered hard
evidence at their disposal, courts often just assume that counsel
for the parties’ engaged in “arm’s-length” negotiations in the
absence of evidence of collusion.32

But the settling parties’ non-adversity cuts against deference to
class-action lawyers, not in favor of it. As Judge Easterbrook has

noted, the “fairness hearing” required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e)(2) may be a “staged performance,” jointly
produced by class and defense counsel, at which “the court can’t
vindicate the class’s rights because the friendly presentation
means that it lacks essential information.”33 The answer to that
serious problem is not to make it worse by deferring to the
lawyers, but to insist that trial courts probe the settling parties’
assertions, listen, but not defer, to objectors (the only true
adversaries), 34 and “act[] as a fiduciary … [to] serve as a guardian
of the rights of absent class members.” 35

31. See, e.g., id. (“Recommendations of experienced counsel are entitled to great
weight in evaluating a proposed settlement in a class action because such counsel are most
closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation.”) (emphasis added; citation
omitted).
32. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 33 (1st
Cir. 2009); Sabo, 102 Fed. Cl. at 628. I have never understood why, in approving class
settlements, courts so often rely on the parties’ “arm’s-length” negotiations and the absence
of collusion. To be sure, in some cases, judges are apprised of the intensity and the length
of negotiations and the degree to which the parties’ have exchanged information relevant
to the issues on the table. But class-action lawyers are sophisticated. It is unlikely that a
plaintiffs’ lawyer explicitly would ask defense counsel for a fee in exchange for providing
the defendant with a low-value settlement that rids it of a potentially costly legal problem.
It is equally unlikely that a class-action defense lawyer would respond to an offer of that
sort by saying that his client would like to collude by accepting the plaintiffs’ offer. In any
event, in most cases, settlement discussions go on behind closed doors, and so evidence of a
sub-optimal deal generally is going to be the deal itself. See Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation ¶ 3.05, comment c, at 209; Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100
F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., joined by Manion, Rovner, and Wood, JJ.,
and Posner, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
33. Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J., joined by Manion, Rovner, and Wood, JJ., and Posner, C.J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
34. See Lane, 696 F.3d at 830 (“Objectors provide a critically valuable service of
providing knowledge from a different point of view, but one that is too often not used
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V. OTHER PROBLEMS WITH DEFERENCE
One element of the judge’s ruling approving the CROA
settlement underscores why courts should never defer to counsel
in approving a class-action settlement. Recall that the judge’s
settlement approval there was premised in part on the fact that
class counsel were “well known to me,” giving the judge a basis
for praising their “exceptional legal abilities” and “utmost
integrity.” 36 But, like many class-action settlements, the CROA
settlement was nationwide in scope, comprised of absentees (and
objectors’ lawyers) who were unknown to the judge. I have
represented absent class member objectors for a couple decades in
cases around the country,37 and I have never been a local lawyer
“known” to the trial judge. And I am not alone. Most objectors’
counsel are not regulars before the court and, thus, are unable to
garner the “well-known-to-me” deference that the judge accorded
the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the CROA case. 38 The result of deference
to settling counsel is to give them an irrational leg up on the
objectors and their lawyers.
Finally, it’s worth examining why judges may like the idea of
“deference” to class-action lawyers. Recall that the judge in the
CROA case said that “the court should be hesitant to substitute its

effectively.”). On the beneficial role of objectors generally, see, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET
AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:PURSUING PUBLIC G OALS FOR PRIVATE G AIN 491–96 (Rand Inst.
for Civil Justice 2000). I recognize that “[i]n some circumstances objectors may use an
appeal [from the approval of a class-action settlement] as a means of leveraging
compensation for themselves or their counsel.” Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 507
F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 2007). Though beyond the scope of this essay, there are ways to
police objectors while encouraging them to play their critical role. See, e.g., Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (2009).
35. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
36. Order, supra note 3, at 22.
37. See, e.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997); Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, 691 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2012); Klier v.
Elf Atochem, 658 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. , 418 F.3d 277 (3d Cir.
2005); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2001); In re
General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.
1995).
38. That judges have given weight to their longstanding experience with the parties’
counsel in approving class-action settlements suggests that, all other things equal, clients
would do well to hire local counsel known to the judge. For the antitrust implications of
certain class-action settlement practices, see, for example, Susan P. Koniak & George M.
Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement , 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1089–1102 (1996).
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judgment for that of counsel.” 39 Again, the judge was not breaking
new ground; many other judges have said the same thing. 40
Perhaps this rationale is appealing because it has a ring to it.
Sometimes, as in certain administrative law contexts, 41 or in
appellate review of district-court fact finding, 42 courts use that
language because the law accords one public official primary
decision making authority over another.
But the law should not accord deference to lawyers. Lawyers
are charged by the adversary system with making arguments for
clients, not to determine the law and facts. Put another way,
contrary to the understanding of judges who defer to class-action
lawyers and worry about second-guessing those lawyers’
settlement recommendations, it is exactly the role of a court to
substitute its judgment for the judgments of lawyers. That’s what
courts do! And that should be all the more true in the class
settlement context because there, as I’ve noted, some lawyers,
unless properly policed, may strike a deal that benefits them at
the class members’ expense.
VI. CONCLUSION
I’m not anti-class action. I favor its vigorous use. Class actions
are often enormously useful tools for justice, and, for decades,
they have compensated discrimination victims, reformed
oppressive governmental institutions, and deterred a wide array of
wrongful business conduct where individuals, acting alone, would
not have had the means or adequate incentive to sue on their
own.43
But class actions can be abused, souring the public, politicians,
and even judges, and jeopardizing the prospect of justice. The
trick is to come up with standards for processing class actions—
particularly class-action settlements—that help promote class
39. Order, supra note 3, at 22.
40. See, e.g., Canupp v. Liberty Behavorial Healthcare Corp., 447 Fed. Appx. 976, 977–
78 (11th Cir. 2011); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 922–23 (6th Cir. 1983); Lopez v.
City of Santa Fe, 206 F.R.D. 285, 292 (D.N.M. 2002).
41. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 7 (2001).
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
43. See Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 F.3d 289, 294–95 (7th Cir. 2010)
(noting both the structural concerns leading to class-action abuse and that class actions are
“indispensable for the litigation of many meritorious claims”).
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actions while curbing their misuse. 44 One small step in that
direction is to assure that courts never defer to the views,
reputation, or experience of settling counsel in determining
whether a class-action settlement is fair and lawful.

44. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF C ONSUMER ADVOCATES, STANDARDS AND G UIDELINES FOR
LITIGATING AND SETTLING CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS, 255 F.R.D. 215 (2d ed. 2006); Brian
Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Action
Settlements, 71 N.Y.U.L. REV. 439, 477–507 (1996).

